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Herbert Simon (1976, p. xii) proposed that decision premises 
should be a primary focus of analysis for the study of organisations. 
This proposal has been ignored by almost all economists, and it has 
been explicitly rejected by the leading economist of organisation who 
is familiar with Simon’s work. In The Mechanisms of Governance, 
Oliver Williamson (1996, p. 44) argues that no usable analytical 
structure for explaining organisational forms has been built on 
decision premises, in contrast to the manifest successes of 
transaction cost economics. The evidence, whether interpreted as the 
revealed preference of economists or as the supposedly decisive 
evolutionary test of survival, is apparently clear. Nevertheless, I 
suggest that the issue is still open. Though this paper is primarily 
concerned with organisational forms and organisational behaviour, I 
propose to begin, as economists profess to begin and as Simon does, 
with the individual decision maker; this will enable us to see both 
why decision premises may be worth specific attention and why 
economists have very rarely given them that attention.  
 
 
The Premises of Theory 
 
 
In standard economics, behaviour is the direct result of the 
rational choices of economic agents. That the ability to perform the 
chosen actions is simply incorporated in the assumptions about 
human knowledge is a major issue which I have explored elsewhere 
(Loasby 1998, 1999); our present concern is that the definition of 
rationality in standard economics makes these choices the logical 
precipitate of the premises from which the agent starts. Economic 
theory itself is a logical system, which is ideally derived from a 
complete and comprehensive axiom set; thus the theorist creates 
knowledge only in the limited sense of revealing what is already 
implicit in the starting conditions – and so does the economic agent. 
The process of deriving necessary implications may be difficult, and 
sometimes yields results which are surprising; but in principle this 
process contributes nothing to the outcome, which (in the absence of 
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logical error) is predetermined. For both theorist and agent, the 
premises are decisive: what one can get out depends on what one 
has put in. Why, then, are these premises not the prime focus of 
enquiry? The answer is simple: the premises are not believed to be 
problematic. For the economist, the major premises of good theory 
are known, and they guide the prescription of the minor premises 
that are appropriate to particular problems; for the agent the 
premises are the basic data of the system, including the correct 
model of that system. ‘And so we have man in this situation: what is 
“the best” for him is known to him uniquely and for certain; how to 
attain it is dictated by circumstances, and can be inferred from 
them. … Conventional economics is not about choice, but about 
acting according to necessity’ (Shackle 1961, p. 272). 
 
In formal organisations, decisions are distributed between 
agents, but their structure is unchanged. Decision premises are 
natural givens, and so the ‘problem of arranging this complex system 
into an effective scheme’ (Simon 1976, p. xii) is simply a problem of 
the efficient allocation of decisions, which is a logical operation. 
Williamson claims that this allocation is explained by transaction 
cost theory. ‘[T]he rejection of satisficing in favour of economizing’ 
(Williamson 1996, p. 44) is essential to this explanation, since it 
prescribes a direct application of the agent’s preference function, 
unqualified by any cognitive limitations. However, Williamson’s 
insistence on economising has the unacknowledged effect of 
devaluing his acceptance of bounded rationality, to which satisficing 
is an intelligent response. Simon’s (1976, p. xxxvii) argument that 
decision premises are actually the means of including rationality, 
interpreted as thoughtful problem-solving, in human behaviour 
illustrates the extent of the conceptual difference between them. 
 
Williamson’s transaction cost theory neatly demonstrates that 
the premises from which we attempt to construct new theory may be 
decisive for the development of knowledge. Indeed his explicit 
rejection of Simon’s theoretical premises reveals an implicit belief 
that premises are chosen and that these choices matter, though 
apparently not for economic agents. However, the premise that 
economists should explain the relative domains of firms and markets 
as an equilibrium allocation is beyond even the thought of 
questioning; nor is it surprising that the allocation is presented as a 
farsighted contract, and that the only costs are those attributable to 
misaligned incentives and asymmetric information, which sometimes 
frustrate the ideal contracts of a supposedly pure ‘market system’. 
That this is an allocation, not of productive activities but of the 
interfaces between them, which turns on the relative costs of 
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contract and governance across these interfaces, has impoverished 
the economic theory of both production and organisation.  
 
This is just one example of the ways in which the decision 
premises of economists have shaped the development of economics. 
Since no economist has any difficulty in pointing to mistakes in the 
basis of reasoning by some other economists, one might think that 
all economists would readily agree that the choice of premises for 
economic reasoning is an important topic for discussion. That this 
conclusion is false indicates that there is something wrong with its 
premises. What is wrong, I believe, is not only that most economists 
have very little idea how such a discussion could be organised; they 
assume, and are encouraged by their training to assume, that the 
basic questions have all been settled. Time is not wasted on 
methodology (except for training in econometrics); economists get on 
with their work. One consequence, as Leijonhufvud (1998) has 
shown, is that economists who are thoroughly trained to use the 
decision premises of modern theory have no possibility of 
understanding Keynes’ theory of unemployment. 
 
 The assumption that all the basic questions of economic 
theorising have been settled leads naturally to theories which 
implicitly assume that the basic questions about agents’ decision 
premises have also been settled. Everyone knows how to decide what 
to do, as well as how to do it; and everyone decides in the same way. 
Macroeconomic theory therefore needs only a single representative 
agent (which does not leave much scope for co-ordination failure); in 
game theory and transaction cost economics it is necessary to have 
at least two agents, but they are still representative agents who can 
be transposed without affecting the analysis. As Douglas (1995, p. 
102) observes of Williamson’s work, ‘firms vary, but not individuals’. 
That, fundamentally, is the reason for ‘the absence of surprise, 
victims, and the like’ (Williamson, 1996, p. 46); it is also the reason 
why economic theories, including transaction cost theories, so rarely 
mention entrepreneurship, and why the modelling of innovation in 
standard economics is so inadequate. On these premises, the firm is 
necessarily a defence against opportunism; it cannot be a means for 
the discovery and exploitation of opportunities, for undiscovered, let 
alone unexploited, opportunities cannot exist in a world of farsighted 
rationality, where information may be asymmetrical but knowledge is 
never in doubt. Casson (2000, p. 281) recognises this implication of 
the standard premises but is unwilling to challenge them, even when 
claiming to set the agenda for the study of international business. 
The impression of the development of economics given in the 
textbooks (when any impression at all is given) is misleading for 
precisely the same reason. 
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One advantage of this commonality of issues is that 
discussions of decision premises in the economy and in the 
economics profession can illuminate each other; and though the 
primary focus of this paper is the former I would like next to consider 
an earlier example of a choice of decision premises which has had 
widespread effects, including a major impact on economists’ 
understanding of the rationale of the firm. (For a more extensive 
treatment see Loasby 2002.) There is abundant textual evidence that 
Marshall believed the choice of premises for economic analysis to be 
of prime importance, and was anxious that the wrong choice should 
not be made; but Adam Smith might have warned him that his own 
proposal to begin with static equilibrium and then switch to 
evolutionary models for advanced work created a ‘gap’in the chain of 
connections that was likely to disconcert the imagination of 
economists too severely to be tolerated (Smith 1980 [1795]).  
 
It was Piero Sraffa who declared this gap to be unacceptable. 
The first half of his celebrated article on ‘The laws of return under 
competitive conditions’(Sraffa 1926) was based on a paper published 
in Italian in the preceding year, now available in an English 
translation. Sraffa demonstrates in considerable detail the difficulty 
of reconciling either increasing or decreasing return with perfectly 
competitive equilibrium, and without further argument declares ‘we 
must then concede that, in general, commodities are produced under 
conditions of constant costs’ (Sraffa 1998 [1925], p. 363). Perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is treated as a fundamental and 
undiscussable decision premise, and variable returns can therefore 
have no place in economic theory. Sraffa’s conclusion in 1926 was 
somewhat different: then it was perfect competition that had to be 
rejected, but static equilibrium remained untouchable. The attempts 
by Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to follow this advice did not 
meet with Sraffa’s approval (Marcuzzo 2001, pp. 87-92), and so in 
his final contribution to this discussion Sraffa (1930, p. 93), not yet 
being ready to present his own solution, was content to insist that 
Marshall’s theory should be discarded. Premises have to be chosen to 
match the competence of the analyst, as Hicks (1939, pp. 83-5) was 
characteristically open in admitting; theoretical possibilities are 
constrained by the perceived bounds of rationality. 
 
Let us compare this choice of decision premises with that of 
Allyn Young in 1928. As Currie (1997) and Ravix (1997) have 
reminded us, Young extended Smith’s theory of economic progress 
through the division of labour and Marshall’s theory of internal and 
external economies through internal and external organisation into a 
vision of economy-wide interactive development. ‘New products are 
appearing, firms are assuming new tasks, and new industries are 
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coming into being. In short, change …   is qualitative as well as 
quantitative. No analysis of the forces making for economic 
equilibrium … will serve to illumine this field, for movements away 
from equilibrium, departures from previous trends, are characteristic 
of it’ (Young 1928, p. 528). ‘Every important advance in the 
organisation of production … alters the conditions of industrial 
activity and initiates responses elsewhere in the industrial structure 
which in turn have a further unsettling effect’ (Young 1928, p. 533); 
and the costs of this developmental process are ‘not the “costs” 
which figure in an equilibrium of costs and advantages’ (Young 1928, 
p. 535). Some of them are clearly what Langlois (1992) has called 
‘dynamic transaction costs’: the costs of changing both production 
methods and the organisational arrangements, within and between 
firms, in order to institute and then improve upon those changes. 
 
Though implicitly agreeing with Sraffa that increasing returns 
and the equilibrium of the perfectly competitive firm are 
incompatible, Young made the contrary assumption, that premises 
should be factually correct rather than theoretically tractable; 
consequently it was static equilibrium that was unacceptable. Like 
Sraffa, he did not argue the case; but he clearly believed that there 
was a choice to be made, and that this choice was of the first 
importance. Ravix (1997) claims that this was a choice about both 
economic method and the explanation of economic development, and 
that Young’s emphasis on the growth of productive knowledge 
matched his conception of the most effective means of progress in 
economic science. There is, I believe, no simple operational rule by 
which premises should be chosen, because the consequences of the 
choice cannot be known in advance; the choice of premises is a 
scientific art, requiring some kind of tradeoff between tractability and 
representational sufficiency – precisely what Simon called procedural 
rationality.  
 
The challenge left by Marshall to his successors as a result of 
his own particular tradeoff evoked orthogonal responses, with 
potentially orthogonal consequences. From Sraffa’s 1925 paper we 
can derive the Chicago insistence on using perfect competition and 
ignoring the plausibility of assumptions, and from his 1926 paper we 
can derive imperfect competition theory, structure-conduct-
performance models, the identification of widespread market failure 
and the hostility to increasing returns so memorably expressed by 
Samuelson (1972 [1967]). From Young’s premises we can derive his 
own conclusion that the interactive process of increasing return is 
the source of economic progress, which cannot be adequately 
considered at the level of the firm alone – as Marshall’s treatment 
had clearly indicated. In this perspective the theory of the firm which 
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arose in the 1930s was the logical response to an incorrectly-
formulated problem. 
 
Though admiring Walras’s achievement, Schumpeter (1934) 
insisted that the premises of Walrasian general equilibrium were 
quite inappropriate to a theory of economic development; and 
Penrose (1959, 1995) followed his example in explicitly dissociating 
her theory of the firm as an agent of development from equilibrium 
theory. Though she does not refer to Young her theory can be 
encompassed within Young’s premises by setting it in the context of 
Richardson’s (1972) vision of the evolving organisation of industry, 
which explicitly relies on Penrosian firms. We may also interpret 
Chamberlin’s (1933) theory of monopolistic competition as a dynamic 
analysis of specialisation, innovation, and market development, 
presented in a static guise as a result of an inappropriate theoretical 
premise (Robinson 1970). I will just pose the unanswerable question 
of how Chamberlin might have developed his ideas had Young, who 
had been his thesis supervisor, not died and been succeeded by 
Lionel Robbins, whose own decision premises were quite different.  
 
 
The Bounds of Rationality 
 
 
If the premises from which economists work have significant 
effects on the development of economics, is it not likely that the 
premises from which economic agents work will have significant 
effects on the choices that they make? In order to emphasise the 
distinctive implications of taking decision premises seriously, I 
propose to impose three drastic restrictions on my argument – none 
of which I believe are finally acceptable in a satisfactory analysis of 
business behaviour.   
 
First, I shall be concerned only with decisions that are taken 
for what are considered to be good reasons, though certainly not only 
with decisions that turn out well. This excludes many decisions 
which need to be understood for any comprehensive explanation of 
the working of an economy – or the working of the economics 
profession; but ‘rationality’ is such a core concept in economics that 
it is appropriate to focus here on reasoned decisions. Like 
Williamson, my presumption in what follows is that agents are 
seeking efficiency; but it is obvious that they do not always achieve 
it. Like Hayek, I believe that we need to understand success before 
we can explain failure; but I also believe that in order to include both 
success and failure within a single analytical scheme we need to 
model processes which are inherently fallible, and not simply 
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because of an unexplained error term or the invocation of ‘trembling 
hands’. I shall argue that it is the need to impose premises that 
necessarily entails fallibility, even if the subsequent logic is flawless. 
Second, I shall assume the faultless application of logic (which is 
rarely observed in practice). Third, although routine behaviour is also 
governed by decision premises, in the form of a classification system 
to which phenomena are assigned and a set of actions which is 
matched to this system, these premises will not be investigated here, 
in order to concentrate on the premises, rules and routines that 
frame logical operations.  
 
In the comprehensive general equilibrium model as perfected 
by Arrow and Debreu allocations are derived directly from the data of 
the economy; there is strictly no scope for decisions and therefore no 
scope for decision premises. If agents are to be allowed into such an 
analytical system, it can only be by providing them with the data 
relevant to their own situation; thus there is no distinction between 
decision premises and data, and therefore no distinct analytical 
category. In the terminology of Potts (2000) the economic system is 
fully connected, and the choice of connections cannot therefore be a 
focus of study. Even if some restriction is imposed on the 
information to which agents have access, this information is derived 
from a full information set which maps precisely onto the data; the 
decision premises therefore do not appear to need attention in their 
own right. 
 
In this perspective it is not surprising that Simon’s conception 
of bounded rationality should be understood as truncated rationality, 
in which the set of decision premises has to be adjusted to the 
limited human capacity for logical processing. It is an obvious 
inference that decisions are to be explained by the way in which the 
premises are truncated; nevertheless the standard assumption in 
treatments of information problems in economics that a full 
information set always exists, but is costly to acquire and may be 
inaccessible to some agents, allows a formal analysis to be applied to 
the acquisition of information or to a decision based on asymmetric 
information when the implications of this asymmetry are known. 
Thus the reduced set of premises is itself optimised, and any 
departure from unconstrained optimisation is precisely adjusted to 
information costs. (Standard transaction cost analysis relies on such 
a second-level optimisation.) The belief that this is an appropriate 
response to Simon’s insistence that rationality is bounded may be 
encouraged by Simon’s own frequent use of chess as the archetypical 
example, for the derivation of an optimal strategy for chess is in 
principle a fully specified problem for someone with sufficient 
cognitive capacity. Simon’s point that even such ‘optimisation in 
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principle’ cannot be translated into any feasible scheme of 
‘optimisation in practice’ is simply ignored. 
 
The conception of truncated rationality as an approximation, 
good or bad, to a fully-specified problem grossly understates the 
difficulties that we face through the intersection of complexity, 
interdependence, and cognitive limitations; ‘rational choice’, as 
defined by economists, is impossible, not because of difficulties with 
formal reasoning but because there can be no way of knowing that 
the premises for such reasoning are correctly specified. The absence 
of any procedure that is known to be correct is the distinguishing 
characteristic of uncertainty, as defined by Frank Knight (1921), and 
it is this characteristic, Knight argues, which is a necessary 
condition for profit, entrepreneurship and the firm. I propose to 
extend his argument by claiming that it is a necessary condition for 
the emergence of institutions, which help us to cope with situations 
in which rational choice, strictly defined, is impossible. It follows that 
institutions themselves cannot be the product of human design, in 
the sense of rational choice; however this certainly does not exclude 
elements of design, and especially of intentionality, in the process by 
which an institution develops. Purpose amidst uncertainty can be an 
effective driver of evolution.  
 
In conditions of Knightian uncertainty or Simonian bounded 
rationality our logical processing must be based on a problem 
formulation which exists in the space of representations; we cannot 
derive our decision premises from the phenomena but have to 
impose a set of premises that we believe, or hope, will be adequate. 
Not only is a fully-connected system unattainable; even the selection 
of connections is fallible, but some connections must be imposed 
before we can apply reason. (Even deriving a winning strategy from 
the rules of chess is a problem of Knightian uncertainty; that is why 
there can be Grand Masters, whose skills cannot be replicated by 
any formula.) ‘It is clear that to live intelligently in our world … we 
must use the principle that things similar in some respects will 
behave similarly in certain other respects even when they are very 
different in still other respects’ (Knight 1921, p. 206). It is obviously 
important that the similarities should be important and the 
differences irrelevant; but whether this is so for any decision must 
depend, in ways which can never be known for certain, on the 
particular circumstances of that decision.  
 
We should therefore concentrate on the variety of ways in 
which problems may be truncated, or framed. ‘Framing effects’ are 
sometimes blamed for supposedly ‘irrational’ decisions; but all 
reasoned decisions must be set within a pre-analytical framework 
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which prescribes the relationships to be investigated and (often 
unconsciously) the relationships to be ignored, the criteria to be 
applied, which are typically sub-objectives, and the procedures to be 
used. Because no framework will be best for all purposes there is 
always a potential for failure through applications which turn out to 
be misjudged; the ‘logic of appropriateness’, when correctly applied, 
ensures internal but not external coherence. But in addition to 
examining specific situations, we should recognise that an efficient 
system response to bounded rationality, and specifically to the 
insufficiency of any single set of premises, is offered by the division of 
labour, which leads to the differentiation of knowledge. The division 
of labour is, in part, a means of economising on rationality through 
the specialisation of decision premises, which encourages the 
evolution of premises which appear to be sufficient for particular 
classes of problem, and thereby increases the effectiveness of human 
reason. 
 
However as knowledge grows in this way it becomes 
increasingly dispersed and asymmetric. Not only will different 
specialists know different things; they will formulate their knowledge 
in different ways, which may make communication difficult, and 
even sometimes dangerous because the receiver’s interpretation may 
be inconsistent with the sender’s intention. (This possibility is 
ignored in almost all economic analyses of information: even ‘self-
disbelieved promises’ are assumed to be interpreted as the deceiver 
intended.) Information has no significance without context, and the 
context for interpretation is provided by the premises on which the 
interpreter relies. As these become increasingly diverse, shared 
interpretations may become increasingly difficult to achieve – 
especially if people come to believe (as economists, for example, have 
done) that their particular interpretative premises have near-
universal validity. Co-ordination may therefore be problematic even 
in a world of universal benevolence. 
 
The conclusions that we reach by formal reasoning may be in 
error because the selection of premises is faulty; and this selection 
must be made by non-logical means. In the most formal of sciences, 
‘the identification of ideal with empirical statements is not deductive. 
Having neglected the uncertainty in our premises, we can never be 
sure of the logical necessity of our conclusions. Every theoretical 
calculation becomes metaphorical’ (Ziman 1978, p. 27). This is true 
of economic theory, as of all sciences, and of decisions in business 
and in our daily lives. The choice of premises for scientific analysis 
sets limits to our knowledge; but without such constraints no 
knowledge is possible. Similarly, the choice of decision premises by 
economic agents sets limits to their actions, but without such limits 
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no reasoned action is possible. Moreover, knowledge may be false, 
and actions may be mistaken. The recognition of these limitations 
has logical implications for the conduct of scientific research and of 
economic activities. 
 
We can now identify four themes for analysis and empirical 
study. The first is the distribution of different clusters of premises 
within the economy, or the basic pattern of specialisation in decision 
making. The second is the relationship among those within a 
particular specialism: how are they grouped and what contacts do 
they have? The third is the pattern of premises currently favoured in 
that specialism, and the implications for what those who work within 
it can and cannot do, and for what they can and cannot perceive. 
The fourth is the relationship between different categories of 
specialists, and in particular the arrangements for co-ordinating 
complementary knowledge, much of which relies on disparate 
frameworks, both within and between organisations. Here are the 
basic issues of economic organisation. It is my view that a 
fundamental premise for analysing them is the context of the growth 
of knowledge; reasoning in terms of fixed information sets is as likely 
to lead to misleading conclusions as reasoning in terms of given 
products and technologies in the 1930s. Opportunism, on the other 
hand, although significant, does not seem to me fundamental to an 
explanation of industrial organisation, for reasons to be briefly 
considered later. It needs to be incorporated at an early stage, but 
the problems and opportunities of developing and co-ordinating 
knowledge deserve priority. 
 
 
Institutions and Organisation 
 
 
An exploration of these themes is far too large a task for the 
remainder of this paper, which will be limited to indicating some of 
the implications of bounded rationality for organisational design and 
behaviour and the pervasive importance of institutions. We begin 
with the problems faced by each individual in trying to behave 
reasonably: how is a situation to be framed in order that we may 
select an action; how are we to close our model in order to put logic 
to work? Our cognitive powers are so limited in relation to the 
complexity around us that we very often feel in need of some 
assistance in filling the gaps. If we always had to give conscious 
thought to our decision premises we would make very few decisions. 
We therefore often look around for help, hoping to follow the example 
of someone who may be more skilful in coping with a particular kind 
of situation. It is in this search for good practice, and the consequent 
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adoption of frameworks and procedures which seem to work for 
others, even when co-ordination is not an issue, that Choi (1993) 
finds the origins of institutions, which provide us with ready-made 
decision premises and rules of procedure. Institutions help us to 
close our decision models and thus permit logical deduction within a 
plausible framework. Furthermore, shared conventions help us to 
understand the behaviour of those who share them (Heiner 1983), 
and create the possibility of tacit co-ordination. What frameworks are 
plausible may vary between groups and over time; and institutions 
may accordingly be local or general, and may change. 
 
Any society requires some institutions of very broad scope; 
more specialised groupings, such as the community of economists, 
develop more specialised premises which both assist the individual 
and facilitate co-ordination within particular areas of interest. (For 
an insider’s exploration of the institutions of science see Ziman 
2000.) All effective human interaction depends on intersubjectivity – 
for example, the shared attribution of ‘moneyness’ to certain pieces 
of paper, the shared interpretation of marks on other pieces of paper 
as the tracks of subatomic particles, the shared belief that replicator 
dynamics provides insight into biological processes or the fortunes of 
a group of firms, the shared response that a report from a firm’s 
research department defines a productive opportunity. The division 
of cognitive labour focuses the attention of each category of specialist 
on particular phenomena, on particular ways of classifying them, 
and on particular ways of formulating problems in order to make 
them accessible to particular logical techniques and the experimental 
techniques which are associated with them; and it allows those 
within each category to learn from each other, even if they are in 
competition. 
 
A firm is such a specialised grouping, which must draw on the 
institutions of a wider society in order to get started but then 
develops particular institutions on which individuals come to rely for 
simplifying their own decision making and as a basis of co-ordination 
within the organisation. If we begin, like Coase, with a theory of 
market co-ordination, but with a more detailed appreciation than 
Coase had acquired in the early 1930s of the reliance of rigorous 
theory on prices that are known (without cost) to be equilibrium 
prices, then we can regard the firm as a substitute for a set of 
contingent claims markets (Loasby 1976, p. 65) and as an arena for 
equilibrating processes; but if we also take account of Young’s vision 
of economic progress, we can also regard each firm as part of the 
mechanism which propels economic systems away from previously-
existing equilibria. They are local centres of specialisation in coping 
with particular kinds of uncertainty. This is Knight’s (1921, p. 255) 
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explanation of the firm as an entrepreneurial creation, which Casson 
(1982, p. 373) has acknowledged as the basis of much of his theory 
of entrepreneurship. ‘Men differ in their capacity to form correct 
judgements as to the future course of events in the environment. 
This capacity, furthermore, is far from homogeneous, some persons 
excelling in foresight in one kind of problem situations, others in 
other kinds, in almost endless variety’ (Knight 1921, p. 241). Casson 
(1982, p. 23) defines an entrepreneur as ‘someone who specializes in 
taking judgmental decisions about the coordination of scarce 
resources’, and begins his analysis with the absorption of 
uncertainty; but, recognising the contributions of Schumpeter and 
Penrose, he then develops the role of the entrepreneur as innovator. 
 
‘With uncertainty present … the primary problem or function is 
deciding what to do and how to do it’ (Knight 1921, p. 268), and if 
powers of deduction are assumed to be infallible but limited, the 
quality of decisions depends on the quality of the premises. Knight 
notes that this quality improves with experience of particular kinds 
of situations, and that this improvement takes time (Knight 1921, p. 
243), thus providing a basic reason why both the external and 
internal boundaries of a firm, which provide some boundaries for 
cognition, should be fairly stable and why performance within those 
boundaries may get better. The possibility of such improvement was 
crucial to Smith’s and Marshall’s theories of economic development. 
The recognition of uncertainty leads to the analysis of an economy in 
time, in which future knowledge cannot be predicted but the 
directions in which knowledge may be increased can be influenced 
by organisation. Casson’s emphasis on the importance of each 
entrepreneur’s distinctive way of organising information as a basis 
for distinctive rational decisions, which has been a continuing 
feature of his work (Casson 1997, 2000), is also an emphasis on the 
importance of the scope of each business and the accumulation of 
experience, and therefore implicitly on the premises for decision 
making. 
 
Search is organised on the basis of locally-corroborated 
conjectures, and the costs of decision making are reduced by 
postponing decisions and then simplifying the postponed decisions 
by a commitment to particular relationships and to particular 
decision premises. Though Coase (1988 [1937]) explains that the 
creation of a firm leads to the avoidance of subsequent market 
transactions, he does not go beyond the foundational contract by 
which a firm is constituted to discuss the costs of creating a 
decision-making system, and does not refer to Marshall’s (1920, p. 
377) emphasis on the capital which any successful business must 
invest in building up its internal and external organisation. He 
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therefore never quite states that the costs of a series of decisions may 
be reduced by appropriate investment, as Casson (1982) does in 
explaining why firms make markets by guiding the creation of 
institutional arrangements which simplify particular categories of 
transactions (Menard 1995, p. 170). Both Coase and Casson, 
however, are in effect writing about the organisation of knowledge, 
which provides credible premises for later decisions and plausible 
procedures for managing the process of decision-making. 
 
In his second article on the firm, Coase (1988 [1972], p. 63) 
recognised that ‘the costs of organizing an activity within any given 
firm depend on what other activities the firm is engaged in’; that is 
presumably why ‘General Motors [is] not a dominant factor in the 
coal industry or why A & P [does] not manufacture airplanes’ (Coase 
1988 [1972], p. 65). It should be noted that Coase’s interest in the 
scope of a firm is not focussed on vertical integration, as is the case 
with transaction cost theories. However he does not say why the 
costs of organising activities should not be additive. The explanation 
lies in the possibility of reusing knowledge (Langlois 1999)  – in the 
present context the possibility of applying the same set of decision 
premises over a wider range or a longer series of decisions (Loasby 
1976, pp. 72-3). A firm provides an agreed framework of decision 
premises which both facilitates decision making and generates a pool 
of experience which may be used to simplify these premises and 
make them more precise (Williamson 1967, p. 136), thus making 
additional managerial services available, as Penrose (1959, 1995) has 
explained. 
 
Penrose has shown how the emergence of such additional 
managerial services may lead to the extension of the scope of a firm’s 
activities, which in the present context may be expressed as the 
extension of well-established decision premises to a new line of 
business, thus relying on continuity to carry change. Contrary to a 
common assumption in economic theory, it is never possible to reuse 
knowledge without cost; but the costs of reuse within a well-
functioning organisation into which that knowledge has been 
integrated can often be much lower than the costs of reuse outside, 
because the latter may require not only the creation of novel 
premises and procedures but even the discarding of some that are 
deeply embedded in established systems. Thus, as Langlois (1992) 
has pointed out, extensions of scope may be motivated less by the 
desire to protect rents than by the costs of transferring knowledge to 
other organisations. A firm may also have advantages as an 
instrument of local co-ordination because it can internalise 
important externalities through the specification of the agenda and 
the criteria for decisions (Loasby 1976, pp. 76-8). 
Economie et Institutions – n°1 – 2e semestre 2002 158 
The organisation of resources within an administrative 
framework (Penrose 1959, 1995, p. 149) is in part the organisation of 
compatible decision premises for the effective use and further 
development of the knowledge which is distributed within the firm. 
Not all firms succeed in establishing such compatability; and if they 
do they may subsequently face the insidious problems of neglecting 
the need for adjustments as their environment changes and even of 
suppressing enterprise within the firm. At the industry level, 
however, the danger of suppressing variety in the process of 
maintaining internal coherence may be mitigated by the variation 
between firms in the minor premises which they use to interpret 
their experience; the activities of their rivals may then serve as 
vicarious experiments. The importance of interfirm variety used to be 
well recognised within the chemical industry, in which access to 
knowledge created by rivals through cross-licensing and the role of 
research departments as importers of technology were major 
premises of strategy; but it is often overlooked in the pursuit of 
global scale. 
 
The suppression of necessary variety may be particularly 
serious if a firm seeks to internalise a cluster of activities which 
though complementary are sharply dissimilar (Richardson 1972). 
The difficulties of matching disparate ways of thinking while 
maintaining compatability between each way and its own particular 
field of application may be very great; and any concentration of the 
power to decide as a protection against the opportunism that 
specificity of distributed knowledge appears to make possible is liable 
to impede both the present use of that specific knowledge and its 
further development. Interfirm collaboration, of varying degrees of 
formality, is often a sensible response to the dilemma of 
organisational versus activity-focussed compatability, because this 
minimises the interface between very different ways of structuring 
problems and facilitates the development of very specialised skills to 
cope with these difficulties, with the aim not of reducing the costs of 
this class of transactions but of maximising their net value (Kay 
1997). 
 
All organisational design is conjectural (Egidi 1992, pp. 166-8). 
In order to make problems manageable it relies on a combination of 
opposing principles of decomposition and aggregation: issues which 
are believed to be sufficiently similar are bundled together (remember 
Knight’s necessary but dangerous principle for living intelligently), 
and separated from other issues by the definition of each manager’s 
responsibility, which is at once a grant of independence and a 
prohibition of trespass. Problems and perceptions are framed in a 
way that, it is hoped, will keep down the costs of decision without 
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significantly damaging their quality. The organisational definition of 
decision spaces creates the local environments within which the trial 
and error learning takes place that drives economic progress 
according to Smith’s basic principle. But this learning is itself 
subject to error: the inescapable difficulties of identifying causality in 
any complex system (the Duhem-Quine problem) are aggravated by 
the falsehoods that are necessarily incorporated in any 
organisational design and reinforced by the natural human tendency 
to take credit for success and assign the blame for failure elsewhere 
(Levinthal 2000). This propensity to error strengthens the argument 
for variety across firms, and also supplies a cognitive underpinning 
to Young’s (1928) association of increasing returns with a changing 
organisation of industry. 
 
 
Authority, Trust and Strategy 
 
 
As Marshall emphasised, the importance of firms in economic 
development lies in their organisation of knowledge. (That this 
organisation might become seriously defective was a problem that 
can readily be discerned in Marshall’s (1919) Industry and Trade). In 
the process they are sometimes – though certainly not always – more 
effective than market relationships in ‘transforming a conflict system 
into a co-operative system’ (Levitt and March 1995, p. 12); but this is 
not to be explained solely, or even mainly, by their power to curb 
opportunism. Indeed, what is striking to anyone who observes 
human behaviour is how many occasions for opportunism are not 
taken. Adam Smith (1976 [1759]), we should not forget, had a theory 
of moral sentiments which is still applicable to small and relatively 
stable communities, and these may include groups within 
organisations; but self-interest may often be sufficient to explain why 
we so often accept other people’s premises for our actions. It is so 
much simpler than constructing our own; indeed, as has already 
been pointed out, we do not have the capacity to supply more than a 
small proportion of our own premises for making sense of the 
situations that we encounter or for deciding what to do about them. 
 
The more complex our economy and our society become the 
more dependent we are on premises supplied by other people. It is 
often a relief rather than a cause for complaint to accept the decision 
premises of an organisation rather than provide our own; many 
people prefer employment to independence (Knight 1921). When we 
recognise the cognitive problems of constructing a coherent 
preference ordering it is not even difficult to understand how we may 
come to internalise organisational preferences, notably in the form of 
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corporate culture, which for good or ill inhibits challenge to the 
current institutions, and may even make those institutions 
undiscussable (Argyris 1994). Many economists, it may be observed, 
seem to be very comfortable with the decision premises in which they 
have been trained, and some find it hard to perceive what there 
might be to discuss about them. 
 
Chester Barnard (1938, p. 163) emphasised that it was the 
recipient of any communication who decided whether it was 
authoritative; and all of us are very happy to find sources of 
communication to which we can grant authority, even when we could 
apparently do better for ourselves by ignoring them (Reynaud 1996). 
Firms provide an environment in which members may develop good 
reasons for deciding whose authority they can rely on as premises for 
their own decisions – or as we might say, who can be trusted – for no 
organisation can work effectively unless each of its members is 
prepared to accept the word of many others, most of whom are not 
their formal superiors. As Kay (1997, p. 215) has pointed out, it is 
very often the case that people agree to work together not because 
they trust each other but in order to discover whether they can 
reasonably trust each other, which of course cannot be done without 
exposing oneself to opportunism. But if knowledge is specialised, 
trust is indispensable. What is missing in the analysis of 
organisational equilibria which is based on transaction costs is the 
effect of process on attitudes and arrangements; and it is missing 
because the premises of the analysis exclude it. 
A firm is an interpretative system, within which people develop 
common ways of understanding, and common ways of responding to 
what they believe they have understood. Especially in a new firm, 
there may be a strong entrepreneurial element in this interpretation; 
as Martin Fransman (1995) and Ulrich Witt (1998) have emphasised, 
a firm may be the location for the construction of beliefs by which 
interpretative ambiguity is resolved. (The resolution may be 
erroneous, or even disastrous; no guarantees are available.) 
Ambiguity, of course, is also the arena for opportunism, and it is not 
unknown for people to construct beliefs in which they have no faith 
but which they use to deceive others; but the desire to impose order 
is so insistent that almost any pattern which is not incompatible 
with our presently serviceable set of connecting principles may seem 
preferable to fragmented knowledge, and crowd out opportunism. 
Often it crowds out the entrepreneur’s own opportunism; 
Schumpeter was probably right in his implicit assumption that 
entrepreneurs believed their own promises. 
In models of efficient and inefficient allocation, strategy can 
hardly be other than an efficient set of paths through a decision tree 
or a set of actions by which to gain some monopolistic advantage. 
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But business strategy, like military strategy, belongs in a world of 
uncertainty; it is a means of resolving ambiguity into a coherent set 
of major premises which promotes the compatability of decisions 
over time and across decision makers. Soon after he had joined the 
research department of a Division of ICI, my former colleague Frank 
Bradbury was writing down the formulae for some chemical 
compounds that he thought might have some commercial application 
when his manager walked past; after scanning the list he simply 
asked ‘Where’s the chlorine, Frank?’ At that time the Division 
produced chlorine in large quantities as a by-product, and its 
researchers had considerable expertise in chlorine chemistry; it was 
therefore natural to impose the use of this by-product and these 
skills as decision premises for research. In a similar fashion, at a 
time when BP had an unmatched reputation for discovering 
productive oilfields but not for marketing the products, the Research 
Director of BP Chemicals told his research staff ‘The objective of this 
Department is to shift crude’.  
 
Strategic decision premises provide structure to a complex set 
of decisions which might otherwise be incoherent. But no choice is 
without opportunity costs, and the pathology of the focus which is 
provided by strategy is bias. Both technological foresight and 
technological oversight may often be explained by the decision 
premises on which crucial decisions were based. For example, 
neither the top management of major corporations nor a 
technologically-based firm of consultants could see any reason why 
anyone should buy a photocopier to do what was already 
accomplished by a typist using carbon paper (Brown 1997, pp. 97-8); 
the contract by which IBM bought DOS from Microsoft, and which 
now appears to have been a disastrous blunder by the former and a 
brilliant coup by the latter, was carefully tailored to the localised 
decision premises of both parties, neither of whom was blessed with 
rational expectations (Porac 1997); and the precisely-calculated 
performance limits of optical lithography rested on well-defined 
physical, technical and production constraints which proved not to 
be binding (Henderson 1997). On the other hand, a novel set of 
decision premises may lead an entrepreneur to deduce the possibility 
of a major innovation. It is not necessary for any single premise to be 
new; as Schumpeter (1934) claimed, what matters is the 
combination, though what he did not emphasise is that this 
combination may follow a good deal of development in what are to 
become the components of the new vision. 




Decision premises are required for decision processes. Theories 
of equilibrium states, even when based on the concept of rational 
choice, have no place for decision processes, for in equilibrium there 
are no decisions to be made. The best theorists have recognised that 
behaviour out of equilibrium cannot be analysed with the standard 
and type of rigour that is now expected, and so they choose 
theoretical premises that exclude it. One of the attractions of game 
theory is that there are no out-of-equilibrium moves; and one of its 
limitations is that multiple solutions or inconsistency within the logic 
of backward induction make out-of-equilibrium thoughts hard to 
avoid. Transaction cost economics, as a theory of efficient 
allocations, is essentially an equilibrium theory, and also avoids 
behaviour out of equilibrium; in an equilibrium theory of 
organisation the transaction is indeed the appropriate unit of 
analysis and the decision premise is not. 
 
If economics is to be defined as the study of fully-defined 
allocation problems, in which it increasingly appears that the key 
requirement is incentive compatability based on rational 
expectations (Myerson 1999), then that is the end of the matter – 
except perhaps to tidy up a few internal inconsistencies by deleting 
such concepts as money and the firm as an organisation. But 
modern economics began with a theory of economic development, 
propounded by a man who was deeply concerned with the 
possibilities of human understanding, human communication, 
sensible action and the possibilities of self-deception. Within that 
tradition it seems important to pay attention to the formation and 
development of the premises on which people reason and the 
knowledge and skills which they may acquire as a consequence of 
economic organisation. 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) suggested that the standard 
distinction between choice and the use of chosen technology is 
potentially misleading; both are activities  which require appropriate 
capabilities deployed within suitable frameworks, as Penrose and 
Richardson have argued. Activities and capabilities are highly 
problematic, very diverse, and may be combined and developed in 
many ways; therefore they merit a great deal of attention, in which 
the causal links with organisation are bi-directional. Activities are 
linked by interfaces, which are justifiably the special concern of 
transaction cost economics; but I agree with Coase, and with 
Demsetz (1997), that problems of knowledge which do not qualify as 
agency problems provide important theoretical premises for 
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explaining the choice of transaction mode. I would go one stage 
further, and argue that the management of a class of transactions, or 
of a particular governance relationship, is itself an activity, and the 
effectiveness of that management depends on the evolved capability 
of the person, or persons, who are doing the managing. Since 
management requires decisions, its quality depends upon the 
managers’ decision premises. Therefore the analysis of transaction 
costs and of decision premises should be incorporated within the 
analysis of activities and capabilities, which is fundamentally an 
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